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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
On May 29, 2009, the district court permanently enjoined Defendant-Appellant Camas

County's (hereinafter the "County") Resolution Nos. 96 and 103 (the Comprehensive Plan and
Land Use Map), and Ordinance Nos. 150 and 153 (the Zoning Ordinance and Map)l; legislation
which had been repealed one year earlier by the County's 2008 legislation. 2 In Martin ], this
Court affirmed the Honorable John K. Butler's decision that Martin lacked standing to challenge
the County's 2008 legislation. 3 Nonetheless, after Judge Butler's Memorandum Decision, the
district court, on May 29,2009 per the Honorable Robert Elgee, permanently enjoined the 20062007 legislation based entirely upon purported procedural errors committed in 2006-2007
legislative process. 4 Concluding that the judicial review provisions of the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act ("IAPA") and the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") applied in a
declaratory judgment action challenging comprehensive planning and zoning legislation, the
District Court held that the County:
(1) Failed to keep a transcribable record pursuant to I.C. § 67-6536.
(2) Failed to comply with the notice provisions of I.C. §§ 67-6509 and 6511.
(3) Failed to make a written record of its decision pursuant to I.C. § 67-6535.
(4) Acted with a conflict of interest pursuant to I.e. § 67-6506. 5

Rejecting the County's arguments that the action was moot and that the PlaintiffRespondent George Martin (hereinafter "Martin") lacked standing, the district court disavowed

I

R. Vol. 4, P. 659-661; R. Vol. 3, P. 523-550.

On May 12,2008 the County had enacted Ordinance No. 157 and 158 (Zoning Ordinance and Map), Resolution
114 and 115 (Comprehensive Plan and Map» repealing all predecessor legislation. See Martin v. Camas County,
150 Idaho 508, 510, 248 P.3d 1243, 1245 (2011) ("Martin I").
3 !d.
4 R. Vol. 4, P. 660; See also R. Vol. 3, P. 547-548.
5 R. Vol. 3, P. 547-548.
2

1

the law of standing as overly restrictive. 6 In awarding attorney fees against the County, the
district court declared that it is irrelevant whether "Martin himself has suffered or is suffering
irreparable harm, or any harm whatsoever ... " 7 clothing Martin with standing on behalf of the
general citizenry.8 Further, while Martin alleged purported procedural errors committed in the
adoption of the County's 2006-2007 legislation, he failed to present argument or even cite to
authority addressing how he was denied due process by virtue of the procedural errors; i.e. a
nexus. 9 It should be noted that this action pertains to the injunction of previously repealed
legislation and, as such, the County's primary purpose in bringing this appeal is to reverse the
district court's award of attorney fees against the County.

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Martin I, this Court briefly summarized the relevant events.
In late 2005 the Camas County Board of Commissioners ("the Board")
instructed the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission ("the
Commission") to amend the Camas County Zoning Ordinance and rezone certain
areas of the county. The Commission submitted an Amended Comprehensive
Plan (Resolution 96) with an amended Land Use Map (Resolution 103) and an
Amended Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance 153) with an amended Zoning Map
(Ordinance 150) (collectively, the "2007 zoning amendments") to the Board,
which subsequently adopted them. On May 4, 2007, Martin filed a declaratory
judgment action against Camas County, seeking a permanent injunction of the
2007 zoning amendments.
On December 28, 2007, the district court granted preliminary injunctive
relief to Martin. 1O The district court found, inter alia, that: (l) the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act (lDAP A) applied to Camas County's zoning
decisions; (2) the action of the County-in enacting the 2007 zoning amendmentsconstituted a quasi-judicial, rather than quasi-legislative, activity and was not
immune from judicial review; and (3) the County failed to maintain a

R Vol. 4, P. 745-746,753-754.
R Vol. 4, P. 744
8 R. Vol. 4, P. 753, See also R. Vol. 3. P. 535
9 R Vol. 2, P.385- 394, RVol. 3.P. 408-414; R.Vol. 2.P. 252-262
10 R Vol. 2, P.196-216.
6

7

2

transcribable verbatim record, as required by I.C. § 67-6536. 11 On March 10,
2008, the district court amended the previously entered injunction to also prohibit
the County from proceeding under the zoning ordinances that had preceded
Ordinance 153. 12 On April 2, 2008, the court entered a separate order of
preliminary injunction on the basis that conflicts of interest existed at both the
planning and zoning and county commissioner levels, in violation of I.C. § 676506.13 ...
On May 12, 2008, the Board adopted a new Amended Comprehensive
Plan (Resolution 114) and Land Use Map (Resolution 115) as well as a new
Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance 157) and a Zoning Designation Map (Ordinance
158) (collectively the "2008 zoning amendments") .... On December 3,2008, the
district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Following Trial granting Martin's requested relief as to the 2007 zoning
amendments. 14 On May 17, 2009, the USDCDI remanded CV-2007-24 back to
the district court. On May 27, 2009, the district court recognized that it had been
divested of jurisdiction prior to entering its order on December 3, 2008, and was
not re-vested until the USDCDI issued an order of remand. The district court
accordingly reissued its December 3 order on May 27,2009. 15
The parties stipulated before the district court [in CV-2008-40 before this
Court as Case No. 36605-2009] that Martin owned the following property in
Camas County:
(1) A forty acre parcel that was zoned as Agricultural ("A") allowing one
residential unit per eighty acres both before and after the 2007 and 2008 zoning
amendments.

11 In that Order, the district court additionally determined that it need not address Martin's peculiarized irreparable
injury:

Plaintiffs primary complaint was a generalized assertion he would suffer from increased
competition ..... [TJhe Court might well issue a preliminary injunction, not necessarily because
there was particular harm being caused to Plaintiff, but because there would be great and
irreparable injury being caused to all the citizens of Camas County."
R. Vol. 2, P. 2l3.
12 R. Vol. 2, P. 234--238.
13 R. Vol. 2, P. 264-280. The district court also determined in the April 2, 2008 order that:
If the Court were entering final judgment today, [a permanent injunction] would be the result
mandated by law without regard to whether Martin himself has suffered or is suffering irreparable
harm, or any harm whatsoever. As it is, it would appear to be irreparable harm to all citizens of
Camas County .... "
R. Vol. 2, P. 278.
14 R. Vol.3, P. 523-556.
15 Martin, 248 P.3d at 1244-1245; R. Vol. 2, P. 326-331; R. Vol. 3, P. 417-419.
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(2) A twenty-nine acre parcel that was zoned A prior to the 2007 and 2008
zoning amendments, and zoned Residential (" Rl ") allowing one residential unit
per acre after.
(3) A one acre parcel consisting of three lots in an existing, approved and
platted subdivision, which was zoned as Agricultural Transitional ("AT")
allowing one residential unit per acre prior to the 2007 and 2008 zoning
amendments and zoned R 1, allowing the same residential density, after. 16
However, since the time of that stipulation Martin has sold the one acre
parcel located in the platted subdivision. At oral argument before this Court
counsel for Martin notified this Court for the first time that Martin no longer owns
the twenty-nine acre parcel. Best practice is to notify this Court in writing, in a
timely fashion, when changes that may affect justiciability occur in the factual
circumstances of a case. As it stands now, Martin owns only the forty acre parcel
in fee simple which was zoned A both before and after the 2007 and 2008 zoning
amendments; however, the parcel's designation on the Comprehensive Plan Land
Use Map was changed from AT to A.
In addition to the property that Martin owns in fee simple, Martin holds
contractual interests in the following:
(1) Two eighty acre parcels in which Martin holds contractual rights for
development, marketing and building. The northern parcel's zoning designation
did not change with the 2008 zoning amendments; the southern parcel was
rezoned from A to R 1.

(2) A sixty-seven acre parcel to which Martin holds the right of first
refusal was rezoned from A to R 1.

16 Martin may argue and the district court erroneously detennined that Martin had standing due to a downzone of
one of his parcels; lot 3, Blk 5 of the Homestead Subdivision within an existing approved and platted subdivision of
one acre lots. (R.Vol.2, P.554). Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zone Agricultural Transitional
(AT) allowing one unit per acre; Prior to the 2008 amendments, the property was erroneously zoned A-5 allowing
one unit per five acres. While a platted subdivision is obviously grandfathered under the existing ordinances, and
thus constituted hannless error, the property was nonetheless rezoned in the 2008 amendments to Residential (Rl)
allowing one unit per acre as originally platted. Thus, at the time of trial (if Martin even owned the property) the
property had not been downzoned and the Court erroneously determined otherwise. Regardless, Mr. Martin no
longer owns this property and the issue is moot. R.Vo1.3,P.625, 629. Martin admitted during oral argument in
Martin I that he no longer owned any properties other than his forty acre parcel.

Martin has sold the one acre parcel located in the platted subdivision. At oral argument before this
Court counsel for Martin notified this Court for the first time that Martin no longer owns the
twenty-nine acre parcel. Best practice is to notify this Court in writing, in a timely fashion, when
changes that may affect justiciability occur in the factual circumstances of a case. As it stands
now, Martin owns only the forty acre parcel in fee simple which was zoned A both before and
after the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendment.
Martin 248 P.3d at 1245-1246. (Emphasis Added).

4

These three properties were given an " R7" designation (allowing seven
residential units per acre) on the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map prior to the
2007 and 2008 zoning amendments, and an Rl designation afterward. 17
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that lAP A's and LLUPA's judicial review

provisions applied in a declaratory judgment action challenging the enactment of a
comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map;
B.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the injunction of repealed legislation based

upon purported procedural errors committed in its enactment was a live justiciable issue and not
rendered moot;
C.

Whether the District Court erred in relieving Martin from the law of standing;
1.

that Martin had suffered a distinct palpable, peculiarized, injury;

11.

that said injury was by virtue of, or had a fairly traceable connection to the
challenged conduct;

11.

D.

that said injury could be redressed by a favorable decision.

Whether Martin demonstrated that his right to procedural due process was violated in the

enactment of the 2006-2007 legislation;
E.

Whether the District Court erred in basing a permanent injunction on finding that the

County violated §67-6509;
F.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.C. §67-6506 was applicable to the

governmental activity in this matter, and, if applicable, that the County did not comply with the
statutory requirements;

17

Martin, 248 P.3d at 1245-1246; See also R. Vol. 2, P. 326-331; R. Vol. 3, P. 417-419.

5

G.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.C. §67-6536 was applicable to the

governmental activity in this matter, and, if applicable, that the County did not comply with the
statutory requirements.
H.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.C. §67-6535 was applicable requiring a

written reasoned decision when enacting comprehensive planning and zoning legislation beyond
the legislation itself;
I.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent is entitled to

an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117.
J.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to award the County attorney fees pursuant to

I.C. § 12-117.
III.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The County seeks attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this action in
accordance with I.C. § 12-117, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 for the reason that
Martin acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law nor reasonable extension thereof.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review ofa district court's findings of fact, conclusions oflaw following a
trial by the court is well established:
Findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous. Where findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent,
though conflicting, evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be
disturbed by this Court. This Court exercises free review over the district court's
conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable
law and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. 18

18

Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442,259 P.3d 586,588 (2011).

6

When this Court reviews a lower court's decision, it detennines whether the evidence supports
the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions o flaw ,19

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING AN IMPROPER STANDARD
OR REVIEW: LLUPA AND IAPA's JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS DO
NOT APPLY IN A DECLARAORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING A
COMPREHENIVE PLAN AND ZONING LEGISLATION.
At the outset of the case, Martin brought both a petition for judicial review (an appellate

remedy) and a declarative judgment action (civil remedy),2o While later auspiciously proceeding
on the declaratory judgment action alone, the district court continued to apply lAP A and
LL UP A's judicial review provisions in a declaratory judgment action challenging comprehensive
planning and zoning legislation,21

The County had argued that lAP A or LLUPA's judicial

review provisions (pre-20lO) could not be utilized to challenge a comprehensive plan, zoning
ordinance, and its associated land use maps via a declaratory judgment action absent explicit
statutory authority,22
Believing this Court's recent decisions pertaining to judicial review effectively preclude
any meaningful review of comprehensive planning and zoning legislation, the district court
simply declared that LLUPA's enhanced due process protections afforded in judicial review
proceedings23 heretofore shall apply in declaratory judgment actions regardless of the individual

Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57,190 P.3d 876 (2008) citing Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 405, 34 P.3d
1085,1088 (2001).
20 R. Vol. 4, P. 744. This is not pennissible. Euclid Ave. Ttust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853, 855
(2008).
21 R. Vol. 3, P. 538,542-543; Martin, 248 P.3d at 1244.
22 "Absent a statute invoking the IAPA's judicial review provisions, [the Board's] actions may not be reviewed
under the IAPA." Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 7-8, 72 P.3d 845, 847-48 (2003). IAPA
provides only limited authorization for administrative "declaratory rulings" by the agency: Idaho Code § 67-5232
(for rules); Idaho Code § 67-5255 (for orders). Such declaratory rules are themselves final agency action subject to
judicial review. See Idaho Code §§ 67-5232(3) and 67-5255(3). In addition, the lAP A contains its own
authorization for judicial declaratory relief actions seeking a detennination as to the "validity or applicability of a
rule." I.C. § 67-5278. As a matter oflaw, planning and zoning decisions are not "rules" issued by "agencies."
23 See I.C. §§ 67-5270 to 67-5279, 67-6519, 67-6521, 67-6535, 67-6536.
19

7

complainant's standing.

In fact, the district court admonished the County for suggesting

otherwise:
Moreover, a statute does exist, in the LLUP A which expressly makes
provisions of the APA applicable to LLUPA. See Idaho Code 67-6521(1)(d). In
fact, the proposition that the AP A applies to county zoning decisions has been so
well established it is difficult to believe Camas County located the Gibson v. Ada
County case without running across the numerous other decisions in the land use
area which support it. Counsel are reminded of their ethical obligation to disclose
controlling authority to the Court. In short, the Court rejects the suggestion that
the provisions of IDAP A do not apply to Camas County's land use decisions. 24
The district court erred in declaring that the County's county-wide zoning ordinance,
comprehensive plan, and associated maps were subject to lAP A's and LLUPA's enhanced due
process provisions via a declaratory judgment action.

V.
ARGUMENT
A.

THIS ACTION IS MOOT: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE INJUNCTION OF REPEALED LEGISLATION WAS A LIVE
JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY.
While this Court may declare the rights, status and legal relations of persons affected by

municipal ordinances pursuant to I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq., one of the prerequisites to a
declaratory judgment action is an actual or justiciable controversy.25

24 R.Vol.2, P. 199. Later, the district court was forced to concede that this Court's recent decisions may preclude
judicial review in this instance. The district court asserted that "Time will tell" whether the County correctly argued
that lAP A and LLUPA' s judicial review provisions do not apply to comprehensive planning and zoning legislation.
The County argued that if "time will tell", this means it is not already told and the County has a reasonable basis to
at least argue the point.
Well, time has told, and the County was correct. The district court rather reluctantly
accepted this fact:

Since that was written, those things have come to pass. Camas County has been the beneficiary of
several rulings significantly narrowing the scope of judicial review.
R. VolA, P. 752-753.
25 Wylie v. State, Idaho Transportation Board, 151 Idaho 26, 31-32, 252 P .3d 700, 705-706, (2011) (internal
quotation omitted) citing State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 597, 809 P.2d 455,458 (1991); Harris v. Cassia County,
106 Idaho 513, 516-17, 681 P.2d 988, 991-92 (1984); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757,
761 (1989).
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This concept precludes courts from deciding cases which are purely
hypothetical or advisory. The right or status at issue "may invoke either remedial
or preventative relief; it may relate to a right that has either been breached or is
only yet in dispute or a status undisturbed but threatened or endangered; but, in
either or any event, it must involve actual and existing facts." .... The elements of
a justiciable controversy include the following:
A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is appropriate for
judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished
from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character;
from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties having adverse
legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting
of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state offacts.
Therefore, courts will not rule on declaratory judgment actions which
present questions that are moot or abstract. "An action for declaratory judgment is
moot where the judgment, if granted, would have no effect either directly or
collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief
based on the judgment and no other relief is sought in the action." Whether an
issue is moot is to be detennined at the time of the court's trial or hearing, and not
at the time of commencing the action. 26
As noted by this Court in Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ.,
("ISEEO"), the mootness doctrine applies to repealed legislation.

27

The general rule of mootness has also been applied to the construction of a
statute or regulation. Actions which challenge the validity or the manner of
implementation of a statute or regulation are often mooted because the provision
has been repealed, amended or revised. There have been cases in which this Court
has held that amended or repealed statutes moot the controversy. See, e.g., Briggs
v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 434, n. 5, 546 P.2d 382, 389,
n. 5 (1976) (Court, in reversing trial court, did not review moot issue of injunctive
relief obtained against state officer under statute that had been repealed in the
interim); Cenarrusa v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 395, 396, 509 P.2d 1316,1317 (1973)
(Court did not consider moot issue of Secretary of State's authority to seek
mandamus under since-repealed statute). 28

26 Id; quoting Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Ed. ofEduc., 128 Idaho 276,281-82,912
P.2d 644,649-50 (1996) (internal citation omitted)(hereinafter "ISEEO").
27 ISEOO, 128 Idaho at 281-82, 912 P.2d at 649-50.
28 Id.
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If the challenged statute no longer exists, there ordinarily can be no real
controversy as to its continuing validity, and an order enjoining its enforcement
would be meaningless. In such circumstances, it is well settled that the case
should be dismissed as moot. 29
As a matter of law, Martin lacked a cognizable interest in enjoining repealed legislation
based entirely upon purported procedural errors committed in its enactment.

Even if Martin

could demonstrate a procedural irregularity AND prejudice to Martin's procedural due process
rights by virtue of that procedural error,30 the obvious remedy is to repeal the ordinance and
provide further process. This had already been done prior to trial. Based upon factually distinct
events, continuing to adjudicate a repealed ordinance's procedural errors is a futile act.

1.

The Mootness Exceptions are Inapplicable.

As this Court noted in Wylie,
[t]he Court may nonetheless rule on a moot issue (1) when there is the
possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the
issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus
is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of
substantial public interest. 31
Citing to 1SEEO, the district court held that the injunction of repealed legislation was a live
controversy pursuant to the "public interest" and "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
exceptions to the mootness doctrine. 1SEEO is distinguishable from the present action.

In

1SEEO this Court determined that the issue whether the State's school funding methods met the

"uniform" and "thorough" education requirements pursuant to art. 9, § 1 of the Idaho
Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors, 508 U.S. 656,670, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d
586, 61 USLW 4626 (1993). Moon v. Investment Ed. of the State of Idaho, 102 Idaho 131, 131, 627 P.2d 310, 310
(1981) (case remanded to district court to be dismissed as moot when statute and rules promulgated under the statute
were repealed before statute ever applied to the parties).
30 Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC v. Kootenai Cnty. Ed. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 557, 237 P.3d 652,654 (2010)
(citing I.C. § 67-5279(4»; Eddins v. City ofLewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010) (" [D]ue process
rights are substantial rights."); Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247 (2006).
3] Wylie, 151 Idaho at 32,252 P.3d at 706 quoting Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 528, 248
P.3d 1256,1263 (2011) (internal quotation omitted) ..
29
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Constitution32 was a live justiciable controversy despite the legislation's sunset clause
purportedly rendering the action moot. 33 As to the public interest exception:
[w]e do not agree that the actions of the 1994 legislature render this action
moot, and hold that a justiciable issue does indeed exist. Although the legislature
made the changes noted above, . .. there still remained in place the Idaho
constitutional requirement of a thorough education. .... This provision has not
been amended or repealed during the pendency of this litigation. The increases in
the legislature's appropriations, the revising of the funding formulas, the adopting
of the statutory definition of "thoroughness," and the sun setting of the Board of
Education's regulations do not answer the question whether a constitutionally
"thorough" education is provided. Even though these statutes and regulations may
be amended or even repealed, there remains a constitutional provision requiring
that the state provide a thorough education. Thus, we hold that all of the
legislature's enactments and changes in 1994 did not render this action moot. 34
Even were we to determine that this controversy is technically moot due to
the sunsetting of the Board's regulations, the issue whether current levels of state
funding meet the constitutionally-mandated requirement of "thoroughness" is a
matter of great fundamental importance. The "thoroughness" of the system of
public education affects the present and future quality of life of Idaho's citizens
and its future leaders, its children. 35
As to the capable of repetition, but evading review exception,
Theoretically, the Board could promulgate new standards every year,
sunsetting the previous year's standards. If this were the case, then each time a
declaratory judgment action is filed claiming that the method of school funding is
not "thorough" under that year's standards, the district court could dismiss the
case as moot claiming that those standards had been sunsetted. Thus, a situation
arises wherein the case is repetitive or continuing, but is incapable of being
resolved. 36
In contrast, alleged procedural errors committed in the enactment of a zoning ordinance
do not inherently possess a temporal impetus necessitating an authoritative determination and is
thus distinguishable from temporally sensitive issues such as ISEEO's "sunset clause", or fact

32 Article 9, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that "it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish
and maintain a general, unifonn and thorough system of public, free common schools."
331SEOO, 128 Idaho at 279,912 P.2d at 647.

34

!d; 128 Idaho at 283-284,912 P.2d at 651-652.

35 Jd.
36

!d.
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patterns inherent in election cases, abortion cases, etc. necessitating judicial intervention. In the
absence of a temporal impetus such as a sunset clause, the district court adopts an overbroad and
presumptive element of bad faith in concluding that, as with any ordinance or statute, the
legislative entity could repass its ordinances year after year simply to evade review. 37 While it is
certainly true that any ordinance or statute is subject to amendment, the district court incorrectly
creates a blanket rule that the mootness exception applies to any ordinance or statute by virtue
that it is subject to amendment. The mere fact that an issue could be re-litigated is not a basis to
invoke the mootness exceptions.
Potential re-litigation of an undecided issue is not the type of collateral
consequence contemplated under this exception. In effect, the State is asking this
Court to issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the issue in future cases; an
exercise this Court will not undertake. 38
As to the general public interest, there is no overarching, ubiquitous and unresolved
constitutional issue as fundamental as the "thoroughness" of public education necessitating an
authoritative determination. Addressed by this Court in numerous cases hitherto, Martin's an
individual right to procedural due process, while certain important, is a personal right; neither
novel nor of little bearing to the interests of the general public, much less a substantial interest. 39
Notably, a finding that this action is moot would in no way deprive Martin nor any other party
from bringing a justiciable action alleging a deprivation of procedural due process. 40

R. Yol.3, P. 529-530. In fact, the district court places great weight in noting that Martin challenged the County's
2008 ordinances as well.
38 State v. Barclay, III, 149 Idaho 6, 9, 232 P.3d 327, 330 (2010).
39 The public interest exception generally involves matters of much wider public interest. Ameritel Inns, Inc. v.
Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 852, 119 P.3d 624, 627 (2005) (finding whether public entities
can use public funds to campaign in elections to be an issue of substantial public interest).
40 As this Court noted in Martin I,
37

a party whose property had been downzoned by the 2008 zoning amendments would
unquestionably have standing to bring this action, as would a property owner who could show a
specific palpable harm that he would incur from the imminent development of an upzoned
neighboring property.
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In the end, public policy and judicial efficiency dictate that a county can and should cure
perceived procedural errors upon its own initiative.

In the absence of collateral legal

consequences to the challenger, temporally sensitive factors necessitating an authoritative
determination, or substantial issues with the general public interest, the mere fact that an
ordinance is subject to amendment does not render an action to enjoin repealed legislation
justiciable capable of redressability especially where the purported injury is a deprivation of
procedural due process; the remedy of which, of course, is further process.

B.

MARTIN LACKS STANDING: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT MARTIN WAS RELIEVED FROM DEMONSTRATING ANY HARM TO
BRING A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION.
The core principle of standing is that only one with a concrete stake in the outcome of a

cause of action is empowered to challenge governmental legislation. A mere bystander,
regardless of the emotional commitment with the principles at issue, is not a proper litigant. 4 !
To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. This requires a showing of a
distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
injury and the challenged conduct. 42

Martin, 248 P.3d at 1244.
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989); See also Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v.
Board ofComm 'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 841, 993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999); Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498,500,960 P.2d
181,183 (1998).
42 Martin I, 248 P.3d at 1248 citing Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105,44 P.3d 1157, 1159-1160
(2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The doctrine of standing originated in the federal courts.

41

Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing
contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual and imminent",
not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical;' Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not ... th[ e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court." Third, it must be "likely", as opposed to merely "speculative", that the injury will be
"redressed by a favorable decision."

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
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Ignoring this most fundamental tenet of jurisprudence the district court declared that "Martin
need not show that .... [he] was in any way adversely affected.,,43
If the Court were entering final judgment today, [a permanent injunction]
would be the result mandated by law without regard to whether Martin himself
has suffered or is suffering irreparable harm, or any harm whatsoever. As it is, it
would appear to be irreparable harm to all citizens of Camas County .... ,,44
Plaintiff s primary complaint was a generalized assertion he would suffer
from increased competition. 45 .... [T]he Court might well issue a preliminary
injunction, not necessarily because there was particular harm being caused to
Plaintiff, but because there would be great and irreparable injury being caused to
all the citizens of Camas County.,,46
In awarding attorney fees to Martin, the district court held:
Martin did not need to prove harm in any respect whatsoever in order to
assert that challenge ... nor did he have to prove (as asserted by Camas County)
this activity had to adversely affect Martin. There is no support in the law for
those arguments. 47
The district court clearly articulated that it's decision is a reactionary measure to this Court's
land use decisions 48 beginning with Giltner Dairy49 but most notably in Burns. 5o As the district
court noted:
[S]ince the Supreme Court has greatly reduced the ability of citizens to
seek judicial review by their decisions ... unless they broadly view "standing",
citizens like Martin may be left with no avenue to redress serious alleged
grievances such as conflicts of interest. . .. If Camas County is successful in
challenging Martin's standing, it will mean that Camas County has succeeded in
making any and all of their actions rezoning approximately 20,000 acres in this
case unreviewable. 5I

R.Vol.4, P. 753.
R. Vol. 2, P. 278.
45 This Court in Martin I evaluated the efficacy of theories of "increased competition", neighboring upzones, etc.
as a basis to demonstrate injury in the land use arena; as distinguished from the tax payer line of cases. Martin, 248
P.3d at 1248-1251.
46 R. Vol. 2, P. 213.
47 R.Vol.4, P.753-754.
48 R. Vol. 4, P. 745, fn. 1.
49 Giltner Dairy, LLCv. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630,181 P.3d 1238 (2008)
50 Burns v. Madison County, 147 Idaho 660, 664, 214 P.3d 646,650 (2009)
51 R.Vol.4,P.745, fn. 1.
43

44
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While attempting to espouse some noteworthy dissenting opinions, the district court simply
misstates the law. As noted in numerous cases, this Court has ably articulated that one who
legitimately incurs an injury may seek redress via a declaratory judgment action. 52
While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not subject to direct
judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of collateral actions
such as declaratory actions. 53
1.

Injury in Fact.

As in Martin 1, Martin has failed to demonstrate a cognizable injury in fact. In Martin I,
the parties stipulated that Martin owned the following property in Camas Countl4 :
(1) A forty acre parcel that was zoned as Agricultural ("A")-allowing one
residential unit per eighty acres-both before and after the 2007 and 2008 zoning
amendments.
(2) A twenty-nine acre parcel that was zoned A prior to the 2007 and 2008
zoning amendments, and zoned Residential ("Rl ")-allowing one residential unit
per acre- after.
(3) A one acre parcel consisting of three lots in an existing, approved and platted
subdivision, which was zoned as Agricultural Transitional ("AT")-allowing one
residential unit per acre-prior to the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments and zoned
R 1, allowing the same residential density, after.

Martin, 248 P.3d at 1244.
Burns v. Madison County, 147 Idaho 660, 664, 214 P.3d 646,650 (2009) quoting Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105
Idaho 65, 66, 665 P.2d 1075, 1076 n. 2 (1983). In McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953
(1993), Mr. McCuskey challenged Canyon County's zoning ordinance and map pursuant to Idaho Code §676511(b), which would have provided him legal, if not actual, notice. He had neither. The resulting legislation
downzoned his property from heavy industrial to rural residential precluding his Circle K gas station for which he
had obtained a building permit. Thus, Mr. McCuskey had clearly suffered a distinct palpable injury (down zone and
stop work order) with a fairly traceable causal connection to the challenged governmental conduct (improper
notice).
54 Martin, 248 P.3d at 1245-46. This Court noted in Footnote 1 that the changes in 2007 and 2008 were largely
identical and thus were viewed in its totality.
52

53

The 2008 zoning amendments superseded the 2007 zoning amendments, which the district court
declared invalid in CV-2007-24; however many of the changes in zoning or designation (on the
planning map) that occurred under the 2008 zoning amendments had also occurred under the 2007
zoning amendments. It is therefore most correct to discuss the condition of zoning and planning
designations before both the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments and the condition of the same
after.
Martin, 248 P.3d at 1251.
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However, since the time of that stipulation Martin has sold the one acre
parcel located in the platted subdivision. At oral argument before this Court
counsel for Martin notified this Court for the first time that Martin no longer owns
the twenty-nine acre parcel. Best practice is to notify this Court in writing, in a
timely fashion, when changes that may affect justiciability occur in the factual
circumstances of a case. As it stands now, Martin owns only the forty acre parcel
in fee simple which was zoned A both before and after the 2007 and 2008 zoning
amendments; however, the parcel's designation on the Comprehensive Plan Land
Use Map was changed from AT to A.
In addition to the property that Martin owns in fee simple, Martin holds
contractual interests in the following:
(l) Two eighty acre parcels in which Martin holds contractual rights for
development, marketing and building. The northern parcel's zoning designation
did not change with the 2008 zoning amendments; the southern parcel was
rezoned from A to R 1.

(2) A sixty-seven acre parcel to which Martin holds the right of first
refusal was rezoned from A to Rl.
These three properties were given an "R7" designation (allowing seven
residential units per acre) on the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map prior to the
2007 and 2008 zoning amendments, and an Rl designation afterward.
As evidenced Martin's pleadings, Mr. Martin's testimony, and the stipulated facts in both this
action and in Martin 1, Martin's sole articulated "injury" is based upon speculative theories of
"increased competition", upzoning of neighboring properties impact supply and demand, and
changes to the comprehensive plan land use designations. 55 As this Court articulated in pertinent
part:
Martin's argument concerning the palpable harm he has suffered seems to
be that: (l) the upzoning of property Martin has no interest in, which is located in
Camas County, decreases the value of the property that Martin owns or holds an
interest in; and (2) the 2008 zoning amendments prevent Martin from developing
the properties he owns, or in which he holds an interest, in the same manner that
he would have been able to prior to the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments.

55 Plaintiff's briefing is bereft of articulated injury other than his references to increased competition, upzones of
neighboring properties impacting supply and demand, and expectations of profit "vested: by a comprehensive plan
land use designation. See R.Vol.2, P.385- 394, R.Vol. 3.P. 408-414; R.Vol. 2.P. 252-262, Tr.P.55 1-564.
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Martin cites to no authority in support of his argument that a
comprehensive county-wide change in zoning designations ... constitutes an
injury to a property owner, absent some resultant specific and traceable harm.
Martin argues that the upzoning of approximately 20,000 acres of property in
Camas County will decrease the value of his property for development, because
of the increase in supply.
. . . Martin argues that he, like Ameritel, will suffer from increased
competition if Camas County's 2008 zoning amendments are permitted to stand,
and, therefore, has standing. ... Martin's purported injuries are thoroughly
speculative and cannot be said to be specific or distinct and palpable. This Court
has never held that increased competition alone is sufficient to confer standing.
Martin next argues that the proximity between the properties he holds an
interest in and other parcels which were upzoned results in an injury .... Martin
argues that the reasoning of Butters should be applied to his situation, since he is
in the business of land development and property near the property that he owns
was upzoned, while Martin's was not. This argument is unpersuasive; the plaintiff
in Butters alleged that she suffered specific and palpable harm as a result of a
conditional use permit that was issued under the challenged zoning ordinance.
Martin has failed to show that he has suffered or is likely to suffer any injury; he
merely speculates that increased competition will decrease the future value of his
property. Martin states that "Martin, like Butters owns land that suffers a distinct
injury, unlike that of the public generally", but fails to explain what that distinct
injury is, merely offering an argument that Martin's property is "uniquely
situated" . Martin offers no argument that any neighboring properties which have
been upzoned are being developed in such a way that Martin will be injured.
Martin next argues that even if the injury he suffers is generalized to a large
group of landowners in Camas County he still has standing to bring suit. ...
Martin has cited to no cases where taxpayer or ratepayer standing has been
granted for a challenge grounded in statute rather than a constitutional provision.
. .. Here, a party whose property had been downzoned by the 2008 zoning
amendments would unquestionably have standing to bring this action, as would a
property owner who could show a specific palpable harm that he would incur
from the imminent development of an upzoned neighboring property. Therefore,
even if the upzoning of property in Camas County could be found to constitute a
generalized injury to some of the remaining property owners that generalized
grievance does not confer standing to sue under the Koch exception.
Martin has not pled facts to support his contention that he cannot develop
his properties in the same manner that he could have prior to the 2007 and 2008
zoning amendments. As noted above, none of the properties that Martin holds an
interest in were downzoned as a result of the 2008 zoning amendments. The
designation on the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map was changed for the three
parcels that Martin holds an interest in, from R7 to R 1, and the forty acre property
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that he owns had its planning map designation changed from AT to A. However,
Martin has failed to cite any authority in support of the proposition that a
residential density designation in a comprehensive plan creates a vested or
enforceable property right. 56
As will be addressed supra, Martin admitted during oral argument in Martin I that he no
longer owned any properties other than his forty acre parceL At this point, does Martin own
even this forty acre parcel? Trial was conducted in this action on August 20,2008; three months
after the County enacted Resolution Nos. 114 and 115 and Ordinance Nos. 157 and 158.

The

district court did not render its final decision until May 29, 2009. Thus, at the time of trial, the
conditions in existence were as this Court determined in Martin I. 57 In short, Martin did not and
will not suffer a distinct palpable injury with a fairly traceable causal connection to purported
procedural errors committed in the 2006-2007 legislative process.

2.

Peculiarized Injury, Not Generalized Grievance

Injury alone does not confer one with standing. The injury must be "peculiarized"; a
"harm or peril personal to him" different than that felt by the community at large. 58
But even if a showing can be made of an injury in fact, standing may be denied
when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of
citizens. 59
Vesting Martin with standing on behalf of the general citizenry, the district court opines that a
peculiarized injury limits only the "landed gentry in close proximity to the alleged 'conflict'
rezone to bring a declaratory judgment action".6o
There may be hundreds of people affected by the decision of the County to enact
a massive rezone of the County. However, because no one in particular has been
granted or denied a permit, Camas County's actions likely are not reviewable by
Martin, 248 P.3d at 1248-1251.
R. Vol.3, P. 629-632.
58 Rural Kootenai, 133 Idaho at 841, 993 P.2d at 604.
59 !d. See also Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 161, 177 P.3d 372 (2008) (internal citations omitted):
60 R.Vo1.4, P. 745, fn. 1.
56

57
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way of judicial review proceeding. Some will argue that the implications of these
rulings might not mean much, because there are those who assert that the
County's actions are always reviewable by way of a declaratory judgment action.
However, the definition of an aggrieved party contained in LLUP A, and the
definition of who has standing to seek a declaratory judgment action are not
necessan'1 y the same. . .. 61
Thus, not only was Martin excused from demonstrating an injury in fact, the district court's
solution was to clothe Martin with speculative standing on behalf of the general citizenry.62
[T]he Court might well issue a preliminary injunction, not necessarily because
there was particular hann being caused to Plaintiff, but because there would be
great and irreparable injury being caused to all the citizens of Camas County.,,63
If the Court were entering final judgment today, [a permanent injunction] would
be the result mandated by law without regard to whether Martin himself has
suffered or is suffering irreparable harm, or any harm whatsoever. As it is, it
would appear to be irreparable harm to all citizens of Camas County .... " 64
Throwing open the courthouse doors to the loudest voice with a generalized complaint, the
district court noted:
In this court's view, whatever the rules may be regarding standing in the context
of declaratory judgments, there needs to be room for citizens to object to what are
allegedly wrongful activities of their governing bodies. If a commissioner in any
county anywhere acts with a conflict of interest, that activity should be able to be
challenged by anyone with the willingness and ability to do so. Courts should not
look for reasons to exclude that challenger from the process. 65

RVoI.4, P. 745-746. Actually, the standing requirements are quite similar. Many believe that LLUPA's standing
requirements for judicial review are merely the legislature's codification of Article III's case or controversy standing
"[T]he legislature cannot, by statute, relieve a party from meeting the fundamental constitutional requirements of
standing." Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). The lAP A provides that a "person
aggrieved by final agency action ... is entitled to judicial review .... " Idaho Code § 67-5270(2). This limitation to
persons "aggrieved" appears to be little more than a legislative recognition of the law of standing. Similarly,
LLUP A limited standing to only an "affected person"; i.e. (pre-201O) "one having an interest in real property which
may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a pennit authorizing the development." Idaho Code § 676521(1 )(a). The only apparent departure from the traditional law of standing is the requirement under LLUP A that
the challenger have an interest in real property. Thus, ironically, the district court's assumption that only the landed
gentry may bring an action is, while absurd, applicable more to judicial review actions.
62 R Vol. 2, P. 545-546.
63 R. Vol. 2, P. 213.
64 R. Vol. 2, P. 288; R Vol. 4, P. 744
65 R. Vol. 4, P. 753.
61
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The district court erred by disavowing "whatever the rules may be regarding standing" in favor
of a personal belief as to what the law "should" be. The declaratory judgment act is not a forum
for those with general complaints about the conduct of one's local board. "It is not enough that
the party is a concerned citizen who seeks to ensure that a governmental entity abides by the
law.,,66
3.

Nexus: Fairly Traceable Causal Connection Between the Purported Injury and
the Challenged Governmental Conduct.

Even a peculiarized injury does not clothe one with standing. Martin must demonstrate a
"fairly traceable" causal cOlmection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct".67
Martin and the district court wholly failed to establish a nexus between the purported procedural
errors and Martin's particularized injury or deprivation of procedural due process. While Martin
alleged purported procedural errors in conclusory terms, he never presented evidence or legal
argument how his right to procedural due process 68 had been prejudiced by virtue a/the alleged
procedural errors nor did the district court make such a finding. 69
For example, the district court's conclusion of law #5 asserted purported procedural
errors pertaining to notice and publication requirements. 7o The County asserted that Martin did
not have standing to challenge alleged defective notice/publication since Martin appeared and

ArnerUel Inns, Inc, 141 Idaho at 852, 119 P .3d at 627.
Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (citations omitted).
68 Ginther v. Boise Cascade Corp., 244 P.3d 1229, 1234 (2010)("A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error
during a prior proceeding and later raise his objections for the first time on appeal" .... Ginther did not advance this
claim as an issue on appeal nor did he support the claim with legal argument or citation to authority. "We will not
consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument." Id; citing
Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357 (1982) and Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 190,
125 P.3d 1061, 1066 (2005).
69 Plaintiff's briefing contain allegations of due process errors but absent is an analysis of an injury or how the error
deprived Martin of a substantial right. R.Vol.2, P. 385- 394; R. Vol. 3. P. 408-414; R. Vol. 2, P. 252-262.
70 R. Vol.2, P. 547.
66

67
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testified at every workshop, informational session, and, public hearing. The County illustrated
its position by distinguishing McCuske/ 1 and Cowan.72 In Cowan, this Court noted that
[T]he Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either
defective notice. First, Cowan's counsel attended the ... hearing and submitted a
brief objecting to notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that
hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were defective, Cowan has failed to
demonstrate how this defect prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had
notice of the meeting. 73
In contrast, due to faulty notice, Mr. McCuskey legitimately did not have actual, constructive, or
legal notice and thus did not attend the hearing which rezoned his property precluding his
manifested intent to operate a Circle K convenience store. Thus, having born a distinct palpable
injury with a fairly traceable causal connection to the challenged governmental conduct, Mr.
McCuskey had standing.
In Ciszek v. Kootenai County, 151 Idaho 123, 130,254 P.3d 24, 31 (2011), this Court
held that while Ciszek may have had standing to challenge a rezone of contiguous parcels for
alleged procedural violations pursuant to I.C. §§ 67-6509 and 6511, this did not equate to a
plaintiffs denial of due process or entitlement to injunctive relief.
[T]here is no allegation that Appellants did not receive notice of the hearings or
that they were unable to attend and speak at the hearings like the petitioner in
Gay. ... "Appellants were given adequate opportunity to express their views.
There simply is no ground to claim that Appellants' due process rights were
violated by the procedure employed. 74
Contending that Martin's actual notice trumps the County's alleged defective legal notice, the
district court disagreed:
If legal notice is inadequate, there are members of the public that would not
attend, simply because they had no knowledge that particular topics would be
McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657,851 P.2d 953 (1993)
Cowan v. Bd. of Comm Irs ofFremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006).
73 See Cowan, 143 Idaho at 513, 148 P.3d at 125.
74 Ciszek v. Kootenai County, 151 Idaho 123, 133-134,254 P.3d 24, 34-35 (2011).
71

72
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discussed. . .. With that in mind it is no answer ... that "you attended that
meeting" and therefore "you were heard" and therefore "never mind that notice to
the rest of the world was improper. .. ". While that mayor may not be the rule in
evaluating due process considerations for judicial review ... , that is not the rule
that should be followed if public legal notice is inadequate in the context of
enacting ordinances such as these. 75
While we dispute these factual findings, the district court nonetheless erred in relieving Martin
from demonstrating a "peculiarized" injury clothing Martin with speculative standing on behalf
ofthe general citizenr/ 6.

C.

REDRESSABILITY: THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER MARTIN PRESENTED A LIVE CASE OR CONTROVERSY AT
ALL STAGES.
While justiciability is a prerequisite to initiating an action, to be eligible for remedy or

reversal, Martin must demonstrate that the case remains justiciable throughout each stage of the
action. 77 "Whether an issue is moot is to be determined at the time of the court's trial or hearing,
and not at the time of commencing the action.,,78 For a distinct palpable injury to be "redressed
by a favorable decision", this presumes the injury still exists at the time of a favorable decision.
In Martin L this Court noted,
At oral argument before this Court counsel for Martin notified this Court for the
first time that Martin no longer owns the twenty-nine acre parcel. Best practice is
to notify this Court in writing, in a timely fashion, when changes that may affect
justiciability occur in the factual circumstances of a case. 79
Jusiticiability continues even on appeal as the United States Supreme Court noted:
Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy at
the time [the] '" court decides the case; it is not enough that there may have been

R.Vo1.3. P. 545-546.
R.Vo1.4.P. 745, fn. l.
77 Wylie, 151 Idaho at 32, 252 P.3d at 706; ISEEO, 128 Idaho at 282,912 P.2d at 650; .
78Id. ("The existence ofthe required elements for declaratory relief, including the existence of a "controversy,"
should be determined as of the time of the court's trial or hearing, rather than at the commencement of the action.")
79 Martin, 248 P.3d at 1245-1246.
75

76
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a live case or controversy when the case was decided by the court whose
judgment we are reviewing. 80
Procedurally, even if Martin could show he was denied procedural due process by virtue
of said procedural errors, is such an injury redressable by a favorable decision? The remedy for
purported procedural due process violations committed in the enactment of an ordinance is
simply to repeal the ordinance and provide further process. This was done prior to trial before
the district court. Martin was clearly provided further process in the enactment of subsequent
legislation; legislation in which this Court determined that Martin lacked standing to challenge.
Substantively, Martin admitted during oral argument in Martin I that he no longer owned
any properties other than his forty acre parcel. Since trial in this action occurred on August 20,
2008 (three months after the County enacted its 2008 legislation), and Judge Elgee did not render
his final decision until May 29, 2009, (after the Judge Butler's decision affirmed by this Court),
the conditions at trial in this action were as this Court determined in Martin I. In short, Martin
did not suffer a distinct palpable injury with a fairly traceable causal connection to purported
procedural errors committed in the 2006-2007 legislative process.

We suspect that Martin no

longer owns a single property in the County and await Martin's full candor notifying this Court
"in writing, in a timely fashion, when changes that may affect justiciability occur".
D.

IGNORING LLUPA'S PLAIN STATUTORY TEXT, MARTIN WAS AFFORDED
ALL THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS TO WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED.
1.

I.C. §67-6536: Transcribable Record: Martin's right to procedural due process
was not violated by virtue of a purported failure to maintain a transcribable record
of every hearing, meeting, workshop, informational session, etc.

While it is undisputed that the County duly recorded each and every hearinl l , the
district court erroneously declared that the County was required to maintain a verbatim
80 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 758 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 55 USLW 4663 (1987); Burke v.
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,402 (1975); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108
(1969).
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transcribable record of not only every public hearing, but every infonnational session, workshop,
and public meeting. I.C. § 67-6536 provides:
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable
verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made .... The proceeding envisioned
by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall
include all public hearings at which testimony or evidence is received or at which
an applicant or affected person addresses the commission or governing board
regarding a pending application or during which the commission or governing
board deliberates toward a decision after compilation ofthe record. 82

a.

" ... in this chapter where an appeal is provided/or"

The district court held that a transcribable record is required "regardless of whether an
appeal is ... available ... ".83 Alternatively, the district court reasoned that because county-wide
comprehensive planning and zoning legislation was quasi-judicial in nature a transcribable
verbatim record was required.
because the action ... is quasi-judicial, and thus reviewable, "an appeal is
provided for" under I.C. 67-6536, and thus a transcribable verbatim record of
certain proceedings is required ... " 84
As stated herein, LLUPA does not provide an appeal, i.e. judicial review, for comprehensive
planning and zoning legislation.

A declaratory judgment action is a civil action not an

administrative appeal. 85

b.

at all public hearings .... during which the ... governing board
deliberates toward a decision after compilation 0/ the record

R. Vol. 3, P. 427
Emphasis Added.
83 R. Vol 3, P. 528; R. Vol 2, P. 266-267.
84 R. Vol 2, P. 201.
85 Ironically, if an appeal was provided for such activity as the district court suggests, then Martin's declaratory
judgment action would have to be dismissed as an attempted "bypass" of the "exclusive source of appeal". Bone,
107 Idaho at 848-849,693 P.2d at 1050-1051. Martin of course knew this. Martin initially brought both a petition
for judicial review and a declarative judgment action, but in proceeding on the declaratory judgment action alone,
the district court relieved Martin from his obligation to pay for the preparation of the transcript pursuant to IRCP
84(g). Thereafter, to seek injunctive relief for the County's purported failure to provide a verbatim transcribable
record, which Martin was relieved from providing, is borderline bad faith.
81

82
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A transcribable record is required for public "hearings" not "meetings". Contrary to the
plain text of the statute, the district determined that a transcribable record is additionally required
for all public meetings, workshops, and informational sessions articulating all such "meetings" as
illegal "deliberations".
The ... County failed to keep a transcribable . .. record of deliberations ...
leading up to quasi-judicial public hearings, after they received recommendations
from P&Z and had compiled at least part of the record. 86
The district court's characterization of "deliberations leading up to", i.e. prior to, the public
hearings illustrates the district court's failure to distinguish between quasi-judicial applications
pertaining to a specific parcel with the legislative process pertaining to comprehensive planning
and zoning. Certainly, in the typical quasi-judicial application, a pre-hearing discussion of a
pending application deprives the applicant of a disinterested decision maker raising bias, ex parte
communications, pre-determination, and other potential due process violations.
With comprehensive planning and zoning, I.C. §§ 67-6507 and 67-6508 require the
County to conduct a comprehensive planning process which is to include citizen meetings,
informational sessions, surveys, etc. in order to facilitate an open, comprehensive planning
process. This does not amount to pre-hearing deliberation. For approximately three years, the
County conducted dozens of publicly noticed workshops, informational sessions, and public
meetings to discuss the necessity to amend the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance.
Obviously, these occurred prior to the public hearing on the proposed legislation. Many of these
work sessions, while noticed, were not recorded. Martin attended nearly every such meeting.

87

The district court, likening this to an ex parte, pre-hearing discussion of a specific land use
application, improperly articulated that any communications prior to the public hearing at a

86

R. Vol 3, P. 544.

87

Tr.P.556.
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legislative workshop constituted illegal "deliberations". This is an invalid characterization. The
statute quite clearly provides that a transcribab1e record is required for deliberations that occur

after compilation of the record. A record is not compiled until the written and verbal evidence
has been submitted at the close of the public hearing. Further, if Martin believed he was denied
due process for lack of a disinterested decision maker in a quasi-judicial application, he was
obliged to present such a due process challenge with controlling authority. He did not.
c.

... at which an applicant or affected person addresses the ... governing
board regarding a pending application

I.C. § 67-6536 limits its applicability to "an applicant or affected person"; an obvious
reference to I.C. §§67-6519 and/or 67-6521 which further bolsters the County's position that I.C.
§ 67-6536 applies only to appeals, i.e. judicial review actions. There simply is no applicant, no
pending application, and no affected party. The district court satisfied this statutory element by
determining that the County itself serves as the applicant. At a minimum, it is a case of first
impression whether the legislature intended that comprehensive planning and zoning legislation
pursuant to I.C. 67-6503, 6708, and 6511 constitutes a "pending application" and whether the
County is therefore deemed the "app1icant".88 This seems unlikely. I.e. §67-6519(4) is limited
to an "applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision". Is the County denied a permit or
aggrieved by its own decision? Pursuant to I.C. §67-6521 (pre-2010), an "affected person" is
"one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or
denial of a permit authorizing the development." Does the County have an interest in real
property impacted by a permit? The County is not the permitee but the permitor; the decision-

88 "Here, a legitimate question was presented as to what constitutes an application ... ; therefore we deny an award of
attorney fees to the County." IHC Hospitals, Inc. v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 188, 191-192,73 P.3d 1198, 1201-02
(2003).
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maker who presides over such issues; not the entity with a stake in the outcome that is aggrieved,
denied, or authorized to develop.
d.

The issue is moot: A record of the actions taken was maintained.

All of this is academic as it is undisputed that the County did in fact maintain audio
recordings for each and every public hearing and deliberation after compilation of the record
pursuant to I.C. §67-6509. 89 The district court, while acknowledging them, indicated he would
not listen to any of them. 90
2.

I.C. §67-6535: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law: Martin's right to procedural
due process was not violated by the absence of independent findings of fact,
conclusions of law accompanying the legislative enactment of county-wide
planning and zoning legislation.

I.C. §67-6535 provides that:
(a) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall be
based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the comprehensive
plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or
county.
(b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall be
in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and
standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and
explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable provisions of the
comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record. 91
The district court reasoned that because the county has ...
taken evidence and testimony in the exercise of a quasi-judicial function ... due
process considerations apply ... [and] the county must make written findings of
fact and conclusions of law. ... Whether the county is acting on a particular
application or on its own recommendation from its P&Z affects whether a party
might be able to seek judicial review, but it does not affect the requirements

89 All Audio tapes were admitted into evidence as Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder, p. 333 (list) and
actual tapes as Defendant's Exhibit T.
90 R. Vol. 3, P. 537.
91 Idaho Code §§ 67-6535(a) and (b) (emphasis supplied).
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imposed by statutes and case law as to whether the county must make written
findings and conclusions.92
Whether the Supreme Court has intended to do away with requirements that
counties enter findings of fact and conclusions of law following quasi-judicial
zoning hearings in cases that do not involve specific "applicants" remains to be
seen. 93
County-wide comprehensive planning and zoning legislation is to be distinguished from an
individual application. It is illogical that the legislation itself "shall be based upon standards and
criteria which shall be set forth in comprehensive plan [or] zoning ordinance ... ", i.e. itself. The
comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map are all written documents
themselves. Res Ipsa Loquitur: "the thing speaks for itself." In order to evidence a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental objective, a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance
must itself amount to a reasoned statement identifying its rationale, criteria, purposes, planning
components, goals, and definitions in accordance with I.C. §§67-6509 and 6511.
The district court's reasoning also conflicts with I.C. § 67-6535's plain statutory text
which applies only to the "approval or denial of any application". In addition to the analysis of
the terms "application" and "applicant" as stated in the preceding section, the plain text is
indicative by its reference to an application's "approval" or "denial". Quasi-judicial applications
are properly described as "approved" or "denied". For example, I.C. § 67-6512 describes the

"[dJenial ofa special use permit or approval ofa special use permit"; I.C. § 67-6513 refers to the
"[dJenial of a subdivision permit or approval of a subdivision permit"; and I.e. § 67-6515
describes the "[dJ enial of a planned unit development permit or approval of a planned unit
development permit".94

In contrast, a comprehensive plan and a zoning ordinance are neither

Vol. 3, P. 538-539.
Vol. 3, P. 541.
94 Id. Emphasis Added.
92R.
93R.
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"approved" nor "denied" but are rather subject to "adoption, amendment, or repeal". 95 This is of
course also academic as the challenged legislation was repealed.
3.

I.C. § 67-6509 - NOTICE: Martin's right to procedural due process was not
violated by virtue of alleged defective notice where Martin meaningfully
participated at each and every public hearing.

Pursuant to I.C. § 67-6509 and § 67-6511, Martin, as an interested member of the public,
is certainly entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties involved in a land-use
decision have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process ...
free from procedural defects that might reasonably have affected the final
outcome. This includes the right for all interested parties to have a meaningful
opportunity to present evidence to the governing board on salient factual issues .
... These cases align with the overarching due-process principle that everyone
with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to meaningful
notice and a fair hearing before an impartial decision-maker. Accordingly, the
Legislature has provided that people who are affected by land-use proceedings for
the most part have a statutory right to notice and for a chance to participate in a
hearing. 96
To facilitate such meaningful participation, I.e. § 67-6509 requires: a) one public hearing, b)
notice in the public newspaper. c) notice to media, d) notice of P&Z's recommendation, e) a
record of the hearings, findings made, and actions taken to be maintained. It is undisputed that
Martin had notice, attended and exercised his meaningful opportunity to testify at each and every
public hearing before both the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of County
Commissioners. Thus, as in Cowan and in contrast to McCuskey, Martin's actual notice trumps
alleged defective notice.

Martin cannot and did not demonstrate that he incurred a distinct

palpable injury or prejudice to a substantial right by virtue of said procedural errors, if any. 97

a.

Written Record of hearings, findings, and actions

95 I.e. §§ 67-6509, 67-6511. I.e. §67 -6511 does refer to an "approval of conditional rezoning or denial of a request
for rezoning ... " Emphasis Added. A county-wide zoning map is neither conditional nor a denial of a "request".
96 Hawkins v. Bonneville County, 151 Idaho 228, 254 PJd 1224,1228-1229 (2011).
97 Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512, 148 P.3d at 1258; Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho at 453,180, P.3d 487,492
(2008); Cowan, 143 Idaho at 513,148 P.3d at 1259; McCuskey, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993).
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Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6509, a "record of the hearings, findings made, and actions
taken" shall be maintained by the County. Contrary to the plain text of the statute, the district
court erringly adds the word "written" to this requirement; that a "written record" must be
maintained. There is no such affirmative obligation required. 98 A record is satisfied with audio
recordings, written minutes, and, most importantly, the legislation itself. Transcribable audio
recordings were maintained and submitted into evidence representing each and every public

hearing for the challenged legislation and the deliberations after compilation of the record.
b.

Written PZ Recommendation is required.

The district court asserted that a written recommendation from the Planning and Zoning
Commission is required by statute. 99 There is no such requirement.

Idaho Code §67 -6509

additionally provides that the
governing board shall not hold a public hearing, give notice of a proposed
hearing, nor take action upon the plan ... until ... the [P&Z] recommendations
have been received ... . Following consideration by the governing board, if the
governing board makes a material change in the recommendation ... , further
notice and hearing shall be provided.
After conducting numerous workshops, informational seSSIOns, and public meetings for two
years prior to conducting its public hearing, the commission conducted a public hearing and
recommended approval of the proposed legislation.

The proposed legislation was thereafter

provided to the Board who approved the proposed legislation as presented. Aside from a staff
report by the planning and zoning administrator, the recommendation is the legislation itself.
There is no affirmative requirement that an additional written recommendation, other than the

98 See Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 37186, p. 4 (IDSCCI) wherein this Court noted that where a statute notably omits a
specific requirement for a "written" finding, unlike I.e. §§ 40-203A(3) and 67-6535 which overtly require it, it is the
plain statutory text that governs the substantive standard; i.e. the omission was intended.
99 R.Vo1.3.P. 533.
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minutes, accompany the 1egis1ation. 10o There is no evidence that material alterations were made
by the Board after receiving PZ's recommendation. Further, Martin failed to assert nor did the
district court address how Martin had suffered a distinct palpable injury by virtue of a purported
failure to provide a written recommendation as Martin was present and testified at both the P&Z
hearings and at the Board.
4.

Conflict of Interest: Martin's right to procedural due process was not violated by
virtue of one Board of County Commissioner's ownership of property inclusive in
county-wide comprehensive planning and zoning legislation.
a. Does I.C § 67-6506 compel recusal in county-wide legislative activity?

"The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal."

101

I.C. § 67-6506 provides that
A member .... of a governing board [or] commission ... shall not participate in
any proceeding or action when the member ... has an economic interest in the
procedure or action.
The question before this Court is whether the district court erred in determining that, in the
adoption of county-wide zoning legislation affecting all properties within the county of disparate
ownership, a conflict of interest exists by virtue of a board member's ownership of property
within the jurisdiction.

While this Court has downp1ayed the relevance of a quasi-

judicial/legislative distinction in the land use arena, this Court has consistently drawn a
distinction between how judges act and how legislators act. Judges are expected to be detached
neutrals. Legislators are expected to be actively engaged in public policy issues impacting the
community. Free access to legislators by the public is a basic part of our democratic process.

See Sopatyk v. Lemhi County,
Turner v. City o/Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840,846 (2007) citing Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho
780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004) see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182
(1980).
100

101
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As such, "[ d]ue process demands impartiality on the part of those who function

III

judicial or quasi-judicial capacities.,,102
"Decisions by a zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to
specific individuals, interests or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject
to due process constraints." "When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter the
governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue,
but sits instead in the seat of a judge." 103
In contrast, "[i]t is beyond dispute that the promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans
and ordinances is legislative action." 104

Consequently, the prohibition operates only when

planning and zoning commissions are acting in a judge-like capacity.
There is sound reason to find that § 67-6506 does not apply to the enactment of
comprehensive planning and zoning legislation. A deemed conflict by virtue of ownership of
property creates an administrative quagmire in the comprehensive planning and zoning process.
Members of county boards and planning and zoning commissions must live within the county in
which they serve. A process requiring recusal from the whole of any proceeding simply on the
basis of land ownership would work two unintended and unfortunate consequences. First, such a
rule would disqualify a substantial portion of the jurisdiction's populace from serving on

Eaeret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004) (citing Sehweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S.
188, 195 (1982)).
103 Turner, 159 P.3d at 846 (citations omitted) citing Eaeret, 139 Idaho at 784, 86 P.3d at 498); Lowery v. Ada
County, 115 Idaho 64, 71, 764 P.2d 431, 438 (1988).
104 Cooper v. Ada County Comm 'rs, 101 Idaho 407, 409-410,614 P.2d 947,949.950 (1980).
102

[T]his test involves the determination of whether action produces a general rule or policy that is
applicable to an open class of individuals, interests, or situations, or whether it entails the
application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former
determination is satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the
action is judicial
Id. See also Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 627, 651 P.2d 560, 561 (Idaho
App. 1982). "This restrained standard of review is appropriate to such legislative determinations as the adoption of
comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning ordinances." Id. The basic idea is that when a county or
city takes action that affects a broad number of people, the action is like that of a legislative body. The remedy is
political, not judicial. "Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt
impact, on the theory that the appropriate remedy can be had at the polls." Burt v. City ofIdaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,
68,665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983) quoting Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410,614 P.2d at 950.
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planning and zoning commissions or boards. Second, the planning and zoning process would
have to occur piecemeal, in violation of such provisions as I.e. § 67-6508 requiring
comprehensive planning take into account the whole of the jurisdiction.

To this author's

knowledge, there is no county in the state that has broken down the county-wide maps into three
separate resolutions/ordinances and managed to exclude the property-owning commissioner from
all the legislative proceedings in adopting the respective map including the required work
sessions, informational sessions, meetings, and ultimately public hearings in adopting a land use
or zonmg map.

The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the governing board member

properties were zoned as part of a county-wide zoning plan based upon independent, historical,
sound planning principles. 105

b. Martin's claimed deprivation 0/ due process requires a nexus between a
particularized injury and the challenged governmental conduct.
As with other due process challenges, Martin bears the burden to present argument and
authority demonstrating not only that a conflict of interest existed but also that he suffered a
distinct palpable injury or prejudice to a substantial right by virtue of that purported conflict.

106

In Manookian v. Blaine County/07 this court makes a strong case that the statute is limited to
quasi-judicial actions by referencing IAPA's judicial review provisions.
The policy behind [I.e. § 67-6506] is essential because, under the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act, I.e. §§ 67-5201 et seq., the findings of fact of an
administrative agency are subject to review only under the "substantial evidence
test "on appeal to a district court. I.e. § 67-5215(f), (g)(5); Van Orden v. State
Dept. of Health & Welfare, 102 Idaho 663, 637 P.2d 1159 (1981). In Idaho a
district court may reverse a zoning decision only if one of the grounds set forth in
subsection (g) of this section is found to exist. Love v. Board o/County Comm 'rs,
108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 1293 (1985). With appellate review so limited, it is

While the testimony is considerable on this issue, see Ir. P. 301-307.
Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452, 180 P.3d at 491; Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254.
107 Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 735 P.2d 1008 (1987).
105

106
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imperative that biased or potentiall~ biased commissioners be barred from
participating in the zoning procedure. 1 8
In Manookian, the applicant utility company sought a conditional use permit to construct
electrical transmission lines across private property. Of the three potential routes identified to
locate the lines, the utility company's proposed route would have sent the line across properties
owned by members of the county planning and zoning commission and board of commissioners.
These members, named Purdy and Gardner, actively objected to the proposed route.

The route

ultimately approved, the "toe of the hills route", passed through the property owned by the
plaintiffs. 109

This court reasoned that utility transmission lines impacted the Commissioners'

land both physically and visually and thus constituted an economic interest. More importantly,
the chosen route which placed the electrical transmission lines on plaintiff's property undeniably
constituted an injury to the plaintiffs. 110
The present action is distinguishable from Manoonkian. In Manoonkian, the properties
owned by the planning members were the subject of a specific application.

The members

specifically diverted attention from their own properties instead burdening the plaintiff's
property. Thus, there was a causal and spatial connection, a nexus, between the peculiarized
injury (power lines in your back yard) and the challenged conduct (the conflict motivated the
selection of option 3).

In contrast, Martin merely raises a purported conflict, but fails to

demonstrate that he has suffered actual, particularized harm by virtue of this conflict.

His

properties remain unaffected, even benefited, by the zoning map. There is no evidence of a
nexus, i.e. a spatial proximity, or any connection whatsoever between Martin's "harm" and the
108 112 Idaho at 701,735 P.2d at 1012.
Every subsequent Idaho case applying § 67-6536 has done so in cases
involving quasi-judicial proceedings. See Brower v. Bingham County Comm'rs, 140 Idaho 512, 96 P.3d 613 (2004)
(§ 67-6506 required governing board member, who was related applicant, to recuse); Gooding County v. Wybenga,
137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002) (conflict of interest exists where approval of governing board member's pending
application required passage of new ordinance).
109 !d. at 699,735 P.2d at 1010.
IloId. at 701, 735 P.2d at 1012.
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benefit, if any, to the commissioner's property. In fact, there was no evidence introduced that of
any benefit conferred upon Chairman Backstrom nor detriment avoided. As with the law of
Standing, ownership of property is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate an economic
interest. I I I
c.

Even

if true, the Appropriate Remedy is to disregard the conflicted vote.

Where multiple decision makers vote on an application, the disqualification of a single
decision maker due to bias, ex parte contacts, improper view, conflicts, or a combination of them
does not automatically invalidate the vote of the entire board. If the disqualified individual did
not cast a "swing vote," the court may uphold the vote of the remaining commissioners. Il2 To
assure impartial decision-making, the role of the district court should have been to determine the
impact of a conflicted vote:
Initially, the court must determine whether a member with a disqualifying interest
cast the decisive vote. If so, the ordinance must be invalidated. If the ordinance
would have passed without the vote of the conflicted member, the court should
examine the following three factors: (1) whether the member disclosed the
interest or the other council members were fully aware of it; (2) the extent of the
member's participation in the decision; and (3) the magnitude of the member's
interest. I I3
In Floyd, the landowner's due process rights were not violated despite the expressed bias of one
of the three commissioners. The biased commissioner was not the swing voter, so his vote was

III

Martin, 248 P.3d at 1250.

Martin has failed to show that he has suffered or is likely to suffer any injury; he merely speculates
that increased competition will decrease the future value of his property. Martin states that "
Martin, like Butters owns land that suffers a distinct injury, unlike that of the public generally",
but fails to explain what that distinct injury is, merely offering an argument that Martin's property
is " uniquely situated" . Martin offers no argument that any neighboring properties which have
been upzoned are being developed in such a way that Martin will be injured.
112 Eacret, , 139 Idaho at 786-87,86 P.3d at 500-01 (biased commissioner was swing voter, so decision was invalid);
Floydv. Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 727, 52 P.3d 863,871 (2002).
113 Floyd, 137 Idaho at 726,52 P.3d at 870.
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simply disregarded. 114 In Eaeret, a variance was granted with a vote of two to one, and thus
conflicted Commissioner's participation did mandate a reversal of the board's decision. liS
While Martin proffered a purported conflict, he has never alleged that his right to
procedural due process was prejudiced by virtue of Chairman Backstrom's participation. The
economic interest present here, if there is one, is distinguishable than that present in Manookian.
Speculative at best, Martin asserts Chairman Backstrom's property received a zone designation
of Commercial, whereas it had previously been zoned Agricultural. This is irrelevant as it is
undisputed that he purchased the property after its land use designation had changed. I 16 He also
testified that it had historically been taxed as commercial property.1I7

This commercial zone

114 Id. Commissioner Christensen definitely indicated his predetennination on the question of the public nature of
the ACR in advance of the 1999 public hearing on the validation proceedings. His actual bias, therefore, rendered
his participation in the due process hearing constitutionally unacceptable. However, the Board's decision holding
the ACR to be a public road was unanimous. There is no proof that the other two commissioners were biased. Thus
Christensen's vote was not the "swing vote." Due process was satisfied by simply disregarding Commissioner
Christensen's vote rather than nullifying the decision and remanding the case for rehearing or reconsideration by an
entirely new body of commissioners. Id; 137 Idaho at 727, 52 P.3d at 871.

115

In Eacret, this Court distinguished Floyd reasoned that:
Commissioner Mueller publicly expressed his position regarding the building of Bottle Bay
boathouses in general. What customarily could be viewed as political or philosophical musings,
became predetennination of a pending controversy when he "wished we're giving the Planning
Department instructions right now to let's allow boathouses .... we need to grant these variances, or
maybe not variances but we need to change things." Mueller's comments regarding a pending
variance request--the Harris variance request--foretold the result of the proceedings before the
Board that were yet to take place.
Based upon Mueller's ex parte contacts and his prehearing statements concerning the boathouse in
Bottle Bay, we uphold the district court's findings of bias, which are supported by the evidence.
We conclude that the district court properly held that Commissioner Mueller's comments and ex
parte contacts regarding the subject variance violated the due process rights of the Eacrets. Under
these the circumstances, Mueller's comments not only created an appearance of impropriety but
also underscored the likelihood that he could not fairly decide the issue in the case. The totality of
these factors supports the trial court's conclusion that Mueller's mind was irrevocably closed on
the subject of the setback variance sought by Harris. Moreover, since the variance was granted
with a vote of two to one, Mueller's participation mandates a reversal of the decision of the Board.
Therefore, we affinn the district court's decision remanding the matter to the Board.

Eacret, 139 Idaho at 786-787, 86 P.3d at 500-501.
116

117

Tr. P. 508, L.16-25.
Tr. P. 498, L. 22-25.
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extends to the south along Highway 20 of which Mr. Backstrom's property is but a small part.
The commercial designation is along a state highway, near an historic town site. 118

The

Comprehensive Plan provides that such use is consistent in historic town sites. The surrounding
area is zoned high-density residential; again, consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. 119 No
pending application or contract existed impacting the property or contingent upon any properties
obtaining a particular zone. No evidence exists suggesting the property at issue was lobbied or
advocated for particular zones or even discussed at all, but was rather part of a comprehensive
county-wide process based upon fully articulated planning principles. Martin has no interest in
the zoning of Chairman Backstrom's property; he has not provided any evidence that the zoning
designations of his properties adversely affected him.

A rule of absolute invalidation of a

county-wide comprehensive plan land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map would be to
turn a blind eye to the facts and circumstances that each case presents. The remedy must bear a
rational relation to the offense committed.

E.

THE COUNTY ACTED WITHIN ITS ENUMERATED POWERS
Perhaps what is most important about the McCuskey decision is that this Court did not

substitute its judgment for that of the board as to whether McCuskey's property should or should
not be downzoned. Absent a procedural error or arbitrary conduct, this Court recognized that it
ought not substitute its acumen/judgment for that of the elected officials as to the prudence of
rezoning property within its jurisdiction. Rather, the court limited its review as to whether 1) the
county committed a procedural error; and 2) the plaintiff suffered harm with a fairly traceable

JJ8
JJ9

Ir. P. 303, L. 13-22.
Ir. P. 303, L. 13-22.
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causal connection to that procedural error. Then and only then, did the court have the power to
void the county's legislation due to its statutory procedural error. 120
In Ciszek v. Kootenai County, 151 Idaho 123, 130,254 P.3d 24, 31 (2011), this Court
held that while Ciszek may have had standing to challenge a rezone of contiguous parcels for
alleged procedural violations pursuant to I.C. §§ 67-6509 and 6511, this did not equate to a
plaintiffs denial of due process or entitlement to the relief sought, i.e. injunctive relief. Rather,
this Court noted that
there is no allegation that Appellants did not receive notice of the hearings or that
they were unable to attend and speak at the hearings like the petitioner in Gay. '"
"Appellants were given adequate opportunity to express their views. There
simply is no ground to claim that Appellants' due process rights were violated by
the procedure employed. 121
Providing a plain text analysis of the applicable statutes, this Court stressed that IDAHO
CaNST. art. XII, § 2, and case precedent interpreting the same empowers the county with the
statutory authority to consider and ultimately approve two rezones in a single application.
Similarly, the County is within its enumerated powers to pass comprehensive planning and
zoning legislation. Mr. Martin, as any other citizen, is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Mr. Martin took full advantage of his rights, but disagrees with the legislative acumen of
the elected officials.

ATTORNEY FEES.
"A party is not entitled to attorney fees if the issue is one of first impression in Idaho ....
Attorney's fees are also inappropriate if the County presented a legitimate question for this Court
to address." 122 If the answer "was by no means obvious" or where the County makes a "good

McCuskey, 123 Idaho at 663, 851 P.2d at 959.
Ciszek, 151 Idaho at 133-134, 254 P.3d at 34-35.
122 Lane Ranch Partnership v. City o/Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91,175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007); See also Kootenai
Medical Ctr. v. Bonner County, 141 Idaho 7,10,105 P.3d 667, 670 (2004).
120

121
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faith attempt to interpret the applicable statutes or [there is] reasonable confusion about the
County's duties", attorney fees are inappropriate. 123 If an agency's actions are based upon a
"reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute," then attorney fees should not
be awarded. 124 This includes a "reasonable attempt to interpret the LLUPA".125
[I]n analyzing an award of fees under I.C. § 12-117, this Court has looked to
determine whether there was no authority at all for the agency's actions or
whether, on the other hand, the law was not clear or unsettled as to whether the
agency had the ability to act. 126
Lastly, attorney fees are not appropriate unless all defenses and claims were asserted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. Where some of the claims or issues are subject to argument, or
where the County actually prevailed on a particular issue, attorney fees are precluded. 127
The level and type of review afforded to certain comprehensive planning and zoning
legislation has been the subject of considerable recent case law. Based upon the argument and
citation to authority as presented herein and in briefing before the district court,128 the County

123 Naylor
124Id..
125

Farms v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 810,172 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2007).

I d..

126Id.
127 Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008)(although plaintiffs action was dismissed as being
moot, the county was not entitled to attorney fees since plaintiffs prevailed on the issue of standing); see also Boise
Tower Assoc., LLC v. Hoagland, 147 Idaho 774, 787,215 P.3d 494,507 (2009) (since the district court failed to
address the plaintiff's takings claims the court could not say that Boise City prevailed on all issues).
128 R.Vol.3,P.562-574. It should be noted that, in awarding attorney fees, the district court analyzed the wrong
statute. The district court cites to Rincover v. State Dept. o/Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473, (1999) a 1999
decision, in support of its maxim that I.e. § 12-117 is limited to "the overall action of the agency"; " ... that the
actions of the county, not the actions of their attorneys in defending the action ... are [the] subject [of] scrutiny."
The district court freely admits that the County's legal arguments presented during the cause of action were quite
reasonable and if that were the standard, would have been persuasive. The district court however asserts that the
plaintiffs actions and legal arguments, no matter how frivolous, and the legal arguments advanced by the county's
attorney, no matter how reasonable, are simply irrelevant.
The problem with citing to a 1999 decision is that I.e. § 12-117 was amended in 2000 expanding the applicability of
the statute to "any" prevailing party. Originally, the statute was applicable only against state agencies and
thereafter, in 1994, against cities, counties, other taxing districts. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 36. Only in 2000 was
the statute turned into a two-edged sword providing for an award of attorney fees to either prevailing party. 2000
Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 241. The district court's focus on the underlying administrative actions of the county board
members, even if true, irrespective of the reasonableness of the County's legal arguments or the frivolousness of
Martin's legal positions is clearly an abuse of discretion in contradiction to the plain language on.e. § 12-117.
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respectfully asserts that it proceeded with a reasonable basis in fact and law at each stage of these
proceedings.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

The County seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117, I.R.C.P.
11 (a)(1) and I.A.R. 11.2. Pursuant to the arguments and authority as cited to herein, the
County asserts that there is no colorable argument in existing law or extension thereof for
Martin to assert that he need not suffer any harm whatsoever but is rather clothed with
standing on behalf of the general citizenry to bring this action.

There is no rationale

argument or extension thereof that Martin had standing to challenge alleged notice defects
by virtue of his actual notice and participation at all administrative stages. Martin flatly
ignores the statutes in asserting that the County must provide a verbatim transcribable
record after being relieved of paying for a transcript.

Martin acted with an improper

purpose under I.R.C.P. II(a)(1) and I.A.R. 11.2 by bringing this action merely to express
his disapproval of the legislative acumen of the County's elected officials and this Court's
statutory interpretation in its land use/judicial review line of case law. 129 Upon repassing
its ordinances providing Martin further due process, Martin's continued prosecution of this
matter manifests an intent to harass the County and his attempt to needlessly prolong this
litigation became undeniable. While it is atypical that this Court awards attorney fees to a
prevailing party on appeal that did not prevail below, this case is appropriate for the
County's fees and costs to be awarded from the outset of this action.

129

Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264-1265 (2010) .
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the County respectfully requests that this Court reverse and
vacate the district court's order, judgment, and award of attorney fees and direct the district
court to enter judgment in the Appellant's favor awarding the County its Attorney Fees and
Costs in defending this Action.
Dated this 13th day of January, 2012.
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

***
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